Disassociation for electronic health record privacy by Loukides, Grigorios et al.
Disassociation for Electronic Health Record Privacy
Grigorios Loukidesa, John Liagourisb, Aris Gkoulalas-Divanisc, Manolis
Terrovitisd
aSchool of Computer Science and Informatics, Cardiff University, United Kingdom
bDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NTUA, Greece
cIBM Research – Ireland, Dublin, Ireland
dIMIS, Research Center Athena, Greece
Abstract
The dissemination of Electronic Health Record (EHR) data, beyond the originat-
ing healthcare institutions, can enable large-scale, low-cost medical studies that
have the potential to improve public health. Thus, funding bodies, such as the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the U.S., encourage or require the dissem-
ination of EHR data, and a growing number of innovative medical investigations
are being performed using such data. However, simply disseminating EHR data,
after removing identifying information, may risk privacy, as patients can still be
linked with their record, based on diagnosis codes. This paper proposes the first
approach that prevents this type of data linkage using disassociation, an opera-
tion that transforms records by splitting them into carefully selected subsets. Our
approach preserves privacy with significantly lower data utility loss than exist-
ing methods and does not require data owners to specify diagnosis codes that may
lead to identity disclosure, as these methods do. Consequently, it can be employed
when data need to be shared broadly and be used in studies, beyond the intended
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ones. Through extensive experiments using EHR data, we demonstrate that our
method can construct data that are highly useful for supporting various types of
clinical case count studies and general medical analysis tasks.
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1. Introduction
Healthcare data are increasingly collected in various forms, including Elec-
tronic Health Records (EHR), medical imaging databases, disease registries, and
clinical trials. Disseminating these data has the potential of offering better health-
care quality at lower costs, while improving public health. For instance, large
amounts of healthcare data are becoming publicly accessible at no cost, through
open data platforms [4], in an attempt to promote accountability, entrepreneur-
ship, and economic growth ($100 billion are estimated to be generated annually
across the US health-care system [11]). At the same time, sharing EHR data can
greatly reduce research costs (e.g., there is no need for recruiting patients) and al-
low large-scale, complex medical studies. Thus, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) calls for increasing the reuse of EHR data [7], and several medical analytic
tasks, ranging from building predictive data mining models [8] to genomic studies
[14], are being performed using such data.
Sharing EHR data is highly beneficial but must be performed in a way that
preserves patient and institutional privacy. In fact, there are several data sharing
policies and regulations that govern the sharing of patient-specific data, such as
the HIPAA privacy rule [46], in the U.S., the Anonymization Code [6], in the
U.K., and the Data Protection Directive [3], in the European Union. In addi-
tion, funding bodies emphasize the need for privacy-preserving healthcare data
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sharing. For instance, the NIH requires data involved in all NIH-funded Genome-
Wide Association Studies (GWAS) to be deposited into a biorepository, for broad
dissemination [44], while safeguarding privacy [1]. Alarmingly, however, a large
number of privacy breaches, related to healthcare data, still occur. For example,
627 privacy breaches, which affect more than 500 and up to 4.9M individuals
each, are reported from 2010 to July 2013 by the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services [15].
One of the main privacy threats when sharing EHR data is identity disclosure
(also referred to as re-identification), which involves the association of an identi-
fied patient with their record in the published data. Identity disclosure may occur
even when data are de-identified (i.e., they are devoid of identifying information).
This is because publicly available datasets, such as voter registration lists, contain
identifying information and can be linked to published datasets, based on poten-
tially identifying information, such as demographics [51], diagnosis codes [33],
and lab results [9]. The focus of our work is on diagnosis codes, because: (i) they
pose a high level of re-identification risk [33], and (ii) ensuring that diagnosis
codes are shared in a privacy-preserving way, is challenging, due to their charac-
teristics [54, 25, 28]. For example, more than 96% of 2700 patient records that
are involved in an NIH-funded GWAS were shown to be uniquely re-identifiable,
based on diagnosis codes, and, applying popular privacy-preserving methods, dis-
torts the published data to the point that they lose their clinical utility [33].
To see how identity disclosure may occur, consider the de-identified data in
Fig. 1. In these data, each record corresponds to a distinct patient and contains
the set of diagnosis codes that this patient is associated with. The description of
the diagnosis codes in Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2. An attacker, who knows that a
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patient is diagnosed with Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, mild (denoted
with the code 296:01) and Closed dislocation of finger, unspecified part (denoted
with 834:0), can associate an identified patient with the first record, denoted with
r1, in the data of Fig. 1, as the set of codes f296:01; 834:0g appears in no other
record. Notice that, in this work, we consider ICD-9 codes1, following [35, 34].
However, our approach can be applied to other standardized codes, such as Com-
mon Procedure Terminology (CPT) codes.
ID Records
r1 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01g
r2 f296.00, 296.02, 296.01, 401.0, 944.01, 692.71, 695.10g
r3 f296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 834.0, 695.10g
r4 f296.00, 296.01, 692.71, 401.0g
r5 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g
r6 f296.03, 295.04, 404.00, 480.1g
r7 f294.10, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01g
r8 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 480.1g
r9 f294.10, 295.04, 404.00g
r10 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01g
Figure 1: Original dataset D.
Diagnosis code Description
294.10 Dementia in conditions classified elsewhere without behavioral disturbance
295.04 Simple type schizophrenia, chronic with acute exacerbation
296.00 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, unspecified
296.01 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, mild
296.02 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, moderate
296.03 Bipolar I disorder, single manic episode, severe, without mention of psychotic behavior
401.0 Malignant essential hypertension
404.00 Hypertensive heart and chronic kidney disease, malignant, without heart failure and with
chronic kidney disease stage I through stage IV, or unspecified
480.1 Pneumonia due to respiratory syncytial virus
692.71 Sunburn
695.10 Erythema multiforme, unspecified
834.0 Closed dislocation of finger, unspecified part
944.01 Burn of unspecified degree of single digit (finger (nail) other than thumb
Figure 2: Diagnosis codes in D and their description.
1http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd9/icdguide10.pdf
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1.1. Motivation
Preventing identity disclosure based on diagnosis codes is possible by apply-
ing the methods proposed in [35, 34]. Both methods transform diagnosis codes
to ensure that the probability of performing identity disclosure, based on speci-
fied sets of diagnosis codes, will not exceed a data-owner specified parameter k.
Data transformation is performed using generalization (i.e., by replacing diagno-
sis codes with more general, but semantically consistent, ones) and suppression
(i.e., by deleting diagnosis codes). Furthermore, both methods aim at transform-
ing data in a way that does not affect the findings of biomedical analysis tasks
that the data are intended for. These tasks are specified by data owners and used
to control the potential ways diagnosis codes are generalized and/or suppressed.
For example, applying the CBA algorithm [34], which outperforms the method in
[35] in terms of preserving data utility, to the data in Fig. 1, produces the data
in Fig. 3a. In this example, CBA was applied using k = 3 and with the goal
of (i) thwarting identity disclosure, based on all sets of 2 diagnosis codes, and
(ii) preserving the findings of studies u1 to u5 in Fig. 3b, which require count-
ing the number of patients diagnosed with any combination of codes in them.
Observe that the codes 294.10, 295.04, and 296.00 to 296.03 are generalized to
(294:10; 295:04; 296:00; 296:01; 296:02; 296:03), which is interpreted as any non-
empty subset of these codes, and that 7 out of 13 distinct codes are suppressed.
The result of CBA thwarts identity disclosure (i.e., all combinations of 2 diagnosis
codes appear at least 3 times in Fig. 3a) and allows performing u1 and u3 accu-
rately. To see why this is the case, consider u3, for example. Note that 4 patients
are associated with a combination of the codes f401:0; 404:00g in u3, in both Fig.
1 and in Fig. 3a). However, the studies u2, u4, and u5 can no longer be performed
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accurately, as some of their associated diagnosis codes have been suppressed.
ID Records
r1 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
r2 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 944.01, 692.71, 695.10
r3 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 692.71, 834.0, 695.10
r4 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 692.71
r5 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 692.71, 695.10
r6 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00), 480.1
r7 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
r8 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 480.1
r9 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), (401.0, 404.00)
r10 (294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03), 834.0, 944.01
(a) Anonymized dataset DA produced by CBA (suppressed codes appear in gray).
ID Utility constraints
u1 f294.10, 295.04, 296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 296.03g
u2 f692.71, 695.10g
u3 f401.0, 404.00g
u4 f480.1g
u5 f834.0, 944.01g
(b) Utility constraints.
Figure 3: CBA example.
In fact, the methods in [35, 34] assume a setting in which data owners possess
domain expertise that allows them to specify: (i) sets of diagnosis codes that lead
to identity disclosure, and (ii) sets of diagnosis codes that model analytic tasks that
the published data are intended for. The ability of the published data to support
these tasks is a strong requirement, and suppression is used when this requirement
cannot be satisfied2. As can be seen in Fig. 3a, the fact that u2 = f692:71; 695:10g
was not satisfied led CBA to suppress both 692.71 and 695.10. The setting consid-
ered in [35, 34] can model some real data sharing scenarios, such as the sharing of
data between collaborating researchers, who perform specific analytic tasks [35].
However, it is important to consider a different setting, where data are shared
more broadly and may be used for studies beyond those that are specified by
2Due to the computational complexity of the problem, no guarantees that these requirements
will be satisfied are provided by the methods in [35, 34].
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data owners. This setting becomes increasingly common, as databanks (e.g.,[2,
5]) host a wide range of patient-specific data and grow in size and popularity.
Addressing this setting calls for developing methods that offer strong privacy and
permit the publishing of data that remain useful, for analytic tasks that cannot
be predetermined, in addition to any intended ones. In fact, the aforementioned
methods [35, 34] are not suitable for this setting, because their application would
cause excessive loss of data utility, as it will become clear later.
1.2. Contributions
In this paper, we propose the first approach for the privacy-preserving sharing
of diagnosis codes under this new setting. Our approach allows data owners to
share data that prevent identity disclosure, and does not incur excessive informa-
tion loss or harm the usefulness of data in medical analysis. This work makes the
following specific contributions.
First, we develop an effective algorithm that prevents identity disclosure, based
on all sets ofm or fewer diagnosis codes, by limiting its probability to 1
k
, where k
and m are data-owner specified parameters. To achieve this, the algorithm trans-
forms data using disassociation, an operation that splits the records into care-
fully constructed subrecords, containing original (i.e., non-transformed) diagnosis
codes. Thus, strong privacy requirements can be specified, without knowledge of
potentially identifying diagnosis codes, and they can be enforced with low infor-
mation loss. In addition, analytic tasks that published data are intended for can
still be performed highly accurately. For instance, as can be seen in Fig. 4, ap-
plying our algorithm to the data in Fig. 1, using k = 3 and m = 2, achieves the
same privacy, but significantly better data utility, than CBA, whose result is shown
in Fig. 3a. This is because, in contrast to CBA, our algorithm does not suppress
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diagnosis codes and retains the exact counts of 8 out of 13 codes (i.e., those in u1
and u3). Moreover, our algorithm is able to preserve the findings of the first two
studies in Fig. 3b.
Second, we experimentally demonstrate that our approach preserves data util-
ity significantly better than the state-of-the-art method [34]. Specifically, when
applied to a large EHR dataset [8], our approach allows up to 16 times more ac-
curate query answering and generates data that are highly useful for supporting
various types of clinical case count studies and general medical analysis tasks.
1.3. Paper organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews re-
lated work and Section 3 presents the concepts that are necessary to introduce
our method and formulate the problem we consider. In Sections 4 and 6, we dis-
cuss and experimentally evaluate our algorithm, respectively. Subsequently, we
explain how our approach can be extended to deal with different types of medical
data and privacy requirements in Section 7. Last, Section 8 concludes the paper.
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r1 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g
r2 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g 834.0, 401.0,
r3 f296.00, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g 944.01
r4 f296.00, 296.01g f692.71g
r5 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g
C
lu
st
er
P
2 jP
2
j=
5
Record chunk Item chunk
C1 CT
r6 f296.03, 295.04g
r7 f294.10, 296.03g 404.00,
r8 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03g 480.1, 834.0, 944.01
r9 f294.10, 295.04g
r10 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03g
Figure 4: Anonymized dataset DA using our DISSASSOCIATION method. The dataset is com-
prised of two clusters, and each record is comprised of a number of subrecords, called chunks.
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2. Related work
We focus on preventing identity disclosure in a non-interactive data sharing
scenario that involves broad data dissemination to potentially unknown data recip-
ients. This scenario has many benefits [23] and allows wider and more effective
use of the shared data. However, the fact that data are disseminated beyond a small
number of authorized recipients poses new privacy challenges, which cannot be
addressed by access control [50] and encryption-based [47, 55, 22, 10] methods.
We also assume that data must be shared at a patient level, which is crucial to
enable clinical studies in several fields, such as those in epidemiology [42] and
genetics [35].
The threat of identity disclosure in medical data publishing was firstly pointed
out by Sweeney [49], and it has since attracted significant research interest [26, 19,
41, 17, 20, 18, 43]. Although other threats have been considered [40, 39, 56, 38],
“all the publicly known examples of re-identification of personal information have
involved identity disclosure” [18]. The majority of works focus on preventing
identity disclosure via relational data (i.e., data in which a patient is associated
with a fixed, and typically small number of attributes), which naturally model
patient demographics. Attacks based on demographics can be thwarted using k-
anonymity [49, 51], which requires each record in the shared dataset to have the
same values with at least k-1 other records in potentially identifying attributes
(also known as quasi-identifiers). To enforce k-anonymity, suppression [49, 51],
which deletes certain values prior to data sharing, or generalization [49, 51, 30],
which replaces values with more general, but semantically consistent values, can
be applied. Different from this line of research, we consider data containing di-
agnosis codes, which require different handling than relational data, and apply
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disassociation, which generally incurs lower information loss than generalization
and suppression.
Anonymizing diagnosis codes can be achieved by modeling them using a
transaction attribute and enforcing a privacy model for transaction data [36, 38,
28, 54, 58, 52, 37]. The value in a transaction attribute is a set of items (item-
set), which, in our case, corresponds to a patient’s diagnosis codes. In [28], He
et al. proposed complete k-anonymity to prevent an attacker from linking an in-
dividual to fewer than k records in the published dataset, even when the attacker
knows all items of a transaction. To enforce this principle, He et al. [28] proposed
a generalization-based algorithm, called Partition. Terrovitis et al. [28] argued
that attackers are unlikely to know all items of an individual and proposed km-
anonymity to guard against attackers who know up to m items. The authors of
[28] designed the Apriori algorithm, which operates in a bottom-up fashion, be-
ginning with 1-itemsets (items) and subsequently considering incrementally larger
itemsets. In each iteration, Apriori enforces km-anonymity using the full-subtree,
global generalization model [57]. Xu et al. [58] proposed a privacy model that
treats (public) items similarly to km-anonymity and a suppression-based algorithm
to enforce it. The algorithm of [58] discovers all unprotected itemsets of minimal
size and protects them by iteratively suppressing the item contained in the greatest
number of those itemsets.
Loukides et al. [35] showed that the algorithms proposed in [28, 54, 58] are
not suited to anonymizing diagnosis codes. This is because, they explore a small
number of possible ways to anonymize diagnosis codes, and they are inadequate
to generate data that support biomedical analysis tasks. In response, they proposed
two algorithms for anonymizing diagnosis codes [35, 34]. The first of these algo-
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rithms, called Utility-Guided Anonymization of Clinical Profiles (UGACLIP) ap-
plies generalization to sets of diagnosis codes that may lead to identity disclosure
in a way that: (i) limits the probability of identity disclosure, based on these sets
of codes, (ii) aims at preserving the intended analysis tasks, which are modeled as
associations between diagnosis codes using utility constraints, and (iii) incurs a
minimal amount of information loss. The sets of potentially identifying diagnosis
codes, as well as utility constraints, are specified by data owners and given as input
to UGACLIP. However, UGACLIP may overdistort diagnosis codes that are not
contained in the specified associations, which limits the ability to use the gener-
ated data in tasks that are not related to the specified associations [34]. To address
these limitations, an algorithm, called Clustering-Based Anonymizer (CBA) was
proposed in [34]. CBA uses the same privacy and utility model as UGACLIP but
employs a more effective heuristic both in terms of supporting the intended medi-
cal analysis tasks and in terms of incurring a small amount of information loss. As
discussed in Introduction, our approach is developed for a different data sharing
scenario than that of [35, 34], and it applies a different privacy model and data
transformation technique.
Another privacy model, called differential privacy [16], has attracted signif-
icant attention [45, 29, 21] and has recently been applied to medical data [24].
Differential privacy ensures that the outcome of a calculation is insensitive to any
particular record in the dataset. This offers privacy, because the inferences that can
be made about an individual will be (approximately) independent of whether any
individuals record is contained in the dataset or not. Differential privacy makes
no assumptions about an attacker’s background knowledge, unlike km-anonymity,
although its enforcement does not guarantee the prevention of all attacks [12].
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However, differential privacy allows either noisy answers to a limited number of
queries, or noisy summary statistics to be released, and there are a number of
limitations regarding its application on healthcare data [13]. In addition, differen-
tially private data may be of much lower utility compared to km-anonymous data
produced by disassociation, as shown in [53].
3. Background
In the previous sections, we highlighted how a patient can be identified by
simply tracing records that contain unique combinations of diagnosis codes. Here,
we present a concrete attack model and an effective data transformation operation,
called disassociation. Disassociation can be used to guarantee patient privacy with
respect to this model, while incurring minimal data utility loss. To quantify the
loss of data utility caused by disassociation, we also discuss two measures that
capture different requirements of medical data applications.
3.1. Attack Model and Privacy Guarantee
We assume a dataset D of records (transactions), each of which contains a set
of diagnosis codes (items) from a finite domain T . The number of records in D
is denoted with jDj. Each record in D refers to a different patient and contains
the set of all diagnosis codes associated with them. An example of a dataset is
shown in Fig. 1. Each record in this dataset contains some diagnosis codes, and
the domain of diagnosis codes is shown in Fig. 2. In contrast to the traditional
attack models for relational data [40, 32], we do not distinguish between sensitive
(unknown to the attacker) and non-sensitive items in a record. Instead, we assume
that any item is a potential quasi-identifier and, hence, it may lead to identity
disclosure. Besides the dataset D we also assume a set of utility constraints U
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[35], also referred to as utility policy. As discussed in Section 2, utility constraints
model associations between diagnosis codes that anonymized data are intended
for. Each utility constraint u in U is a set of items from T , and all constraints in
U are disjoint. Fig. 3b illustrates an example of a set of utility constraints.
We now explain the attack model considered in this work. In this model, an
attacker knows up to m items of a record r in D, where m  1. The case of
attackers with no background knowledge (i.e., m = 0) is trivial, and it is easy
to see that the results of our theoretical analysis are applicable to this setting as
well. Note that, different from the methods in [35, 34], the items that may be
exploited by attackers are considered unknown to data owners. Also, there may
be multiple attackers, each of which knows a (not necessarily distinct) set of up to
m items of a record r. Other attacks and the ability of our method to thwart them
are discussed in Section 7.
Based on their knowledge, an attacker can associate the identified patient with
their record r, breaching privacy. To thwart this threat, our work employs the
privacy model of km-anonymity [54]. km-anonymity is a conditional form of k-
anonymity, which ensures that an attacker with partial knowledge of a record r,
as explained above, will not be able to distinguish r from k 1 other records in
the published dataset. In other words, the probability that the attacker performs
identity disclosure is upperbounded by 1
k
. More formally:
Definition 1. An anonymized dataset DA is km-anonymous if no attacker with
background knowledge of up to m items of a record r in DA can use these items
to identify fewer than k candidate records in DA.
For the original dataset D and its anonymized counterpart DA, we define two
transformations A and I. The anonymization transformation A takes as input
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a dataset D and produces an anonymized dataset DA. The inverse transforma-
tion I takes as input the anonymized dataset DA and outputs all possible (non-
anonymized) datasets that could produce DA, i.e., I(DA) = fD0 j DA = A(D)g.
Obviously, the original dataset D is one of the datasets in I(A(D)). To achieve
km-anonymity (Definition 1) in our setting, we enforce the following privacy guar-
antee (from [53]).
Guarantee 1. Consider an anonymized dataset DA and a set S of up tom items.
Applying I(DA), will always produce at least one dataset D0 2 I(DA) for which
there are at least k records that contain all items in S .
Intuitively, an attacker, who knows any set S of up tom diagnosis codes about
a patient, will have to consider at least k candidate records in a possible original
dataset. We provide a concrete example to illustrate this in the next subsection.
3.2. Overview of the disassociation transformation strategy
In this section, we present disassociation, a data transformation strategy that
partitions the records in the original datasetD into subrecords, following the basic
principles of the strategy presented in [53]. The goal of our strategy is to “hide”
combinations of diagnosis codes that appear few times in D, by scattering them
in the subrecords of the published dataset. The particular merit of disassociation
is that it preserves all original diagnosis codes in the published dataset, in contrast
to generalization and suppression. This is important to preserve data utility in
various medical analysis tasks that cannot be predetermined, as explained in the
introduction and will be verified experimentally.
To illustrate the main idea of disassociation, we use Fig. 4, which shows a
disassociated dataset produced from the original dataset D of Fig. 1. Observe
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that the dataset in Fig. 4 is divided into two clusters, P1 and P2, which contain
the records r1 r5 and r6 r10, respectively. Furthermore, the diagnosis codes
in a cluster are divided into subsets, and each record in the cluster is split into
subrecords according to these subsets. For example, the diagnosis codes in P1 are
divided into subsets T1 =f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g, T2 =f692.71, 695.10g, and
TT =f834.0, 401.0, 944.01g, according to which r1 is split into three subrecords;
f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g, an empty subrecord fg, and f834.0, 944.01g. The
collection of all subrecords of different records that correspond to the same subset
of diagnosis codes is called a chunk. For instance, the subrecord f296.00, 296.01,
296.02g of r1 goes into chunk C1, the empty subrecord goes into chunk C2, and
the subrecord f834.0, 944.01g goes into chunk CT . In contrast to C1 and C2
which are record chunks, CT is a special, item chunk, containing a single set of
diagnosis codes. In our example, CT contains the set f834.0, 401.0, 944.01g,
which represents the subrecords from all r1 r5 containing these codes. Thus,
the number of times each diagnosis code in CT appears in the original dataset
is completely hidden from the attacker, who can only assume that this number
ranges from 1 to jPij, where jPij is the number of records in Pi.
In addition, the order of the subrecords that fall into a chunk is randomized,
which implies that the association between subrecords in different chunks is hid-
den from the attacker. In fact, the original dataset D may contain any record that
could be reconstructed by a combination of subrecords from the different chunks
plus any subset of diagnosis codes fromCT . For example, f296.00, 296.01, 834.0,
944.01g in Fig. 5 is a reconstructed record, which is created by taking f296.00,
296.01g from C1, the empty subrecord fg from C2, and f834.0, 944.01g from
CT . Observe that this record does not appear in the original dataset of Fig. 1.
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The disassociated dataset DA amounts to the set of all possible original datasets
I(DA) (see Guarantee 1). In other words, the original datasetD is hidden, among
all possible datasets that can be reconstructed from DA. A dataset, which is re-
constructed from the disassociated dataset in Fig. 4, is shown in Fig. 5. Note that
reconstructed datasets can be greatly useful to data analysts, because (i) they have
similar statistical properties to the original dataset from which they are produced,
and (ii) they can be analyzed directly, using off-the-shelf tools (e.g., SPSS), in
contrast to generalized datasets that require special handling (e.g., interpreting a
generalized code as an original diagnosis code, with a certain probability).
As an example, consider the dataset in Fig. 4, which satisfies Guarantee 1, for
k = 3 and m = 2. Observe that an attacker, who knows up to m = 2 codes from
a record r of the original dataset in Fig. 1, must consider a reconstructed dataset
that has at least 3 records containing the codes known to them. We emphasize
that each of these codes can appear in any chunk of a cluster in DA, including
the item chunk. For instance, an attacker, who knows that the record of a patient
contains 296.01 and 834.0, must consider the dataset in Fig. 5. In this dataset, the
combination of these codes appears in the records r1, r2, and r3.
ID Records
r1 f296.00, 296.01, 834.0, 944.01g
r2 f296.02, 296.01, 692.71, 834.0g
r3 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10, 834.0g
r4 f296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g
r5 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10, 401.0g
r6 f296.02, 295.04, 480.1g
r7 f294.10, 296.02, 404.00, 834.0, 944.01g
r8 f294.10, 295.04, 296.02, 480.1, 834.0g
r9 f294.10, 295.04, 404.00, 834.0g
r10 f294.10, 295.04, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01g
Figure 5: A possible dataset D0 reconstructed from DA of Figure 4.
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3.3. Measuring Data Utility
Different datasets that can be produced by an original dataset, using disas-
sociation, do not offer the same utility. In addition, most existing measures for
anonymized data using generalization and/or suppression, such as those proposed
in [54, 58, 35, 34], are not applicable to disassociated datasets. Therefore, we
measure data utility using the accuracy of: (i) answering COUNT queries on dis-
associated data, and (ii) estimating the number of records that are associated with
any set of diagnosis codes in a utility constraint (i.e., matched to the constraint).
The first way to measure data utility considers a scenario in which data recipi-
ents issue queries to perform case counting (i.e., discover the number of patients
diagnosed with a set of one or more diagnosis codes, using COUNT queries).
Alike other transformation strategies, disassociation may degrade the accuracy of
answering COUNT queries [35, 53]. Thus, a utility measure must capture how
accurately such queries can be answered using disassociated data. The second
way to quantify data utility considers a scenario in which various analytic tasks,
simulated through different utility policies, are performed by data recipients. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no measures that can capture data utility in
this scenario.
To quantify the accuracy of answering a workload of COUNT queries on dis-
associated data, we use the Average Relative Error (ARE) measure, a standard
data utility indicator [35, 34, 53], which reflects the average number of trans-
actions that are retrieved incorrectly as part of query answers. The following
definition explains how ARE can be computed.
Definition 2. LetW be a workload of COUNT queries q1; :::; qn, and CA and CO
be functions which count the number of records answering a query qi, i 2 [1; n]
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on the anonymized dataset D0 and on the original dataset D, respectively. The
ARE measure forW is computed as
ARE(W) = avg8i2[1;n] jCA(qi)  CO(qi)j
CO(qi)
Thus, ARE is computed as the mean error of answering all queries in the query
workloadW . Clearly, a zero ARE implies that the anonymized dataset D0 are as
useful as the original dataset in answering the queries in W , and low scores in
ARE are preferred.
To capture data utility in the presence of specified utility policies, we propose
a new measure, calledMatching Relative Error (MRE). The computation of MRE
is illustrated in the following definition.
Definition 3. Let u be a utility constraint in U , and MA and MO be functions,
which return the number of records that match u in the anonymized dataset D0
and in the original dataset D, respectively. The MRE for u is computed as
MRE(u) =
MO(u) MA(u)
MO(u)
Thus, a zero MRE implies that an anonymized dataset can support u as well as
the original dataset does, and MRE scores close to zero are preferred. For clarity,
we report MRE as a percentage (i.e., the percent error). For example, an MRE
in the interval [ 5%; 5%] implies that the number of transactions that match the
utility constraint in the anonymized dataset is no more than 5% different (larger
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or smaller) than the corresponding number in the original dataset.
It is easy to see that ARE and MRE are applicable to several different work-
loads and utility constraints, respectively. For instance, in our experiments (Sec-
tion 6), we used workloads containing sets of diagnosis codes that a certain per-
centage of all patients have, and utility constraints that model semantic relation-
ships between diagnosis codes. Also, Definitions 2 and 3 refer to an anonymized
datasetD0, without restricting the data transformation strategy applied to produce
it. For instance,D0 can be a reconstructed dataset, such as the dataset in Fig. 5, or
a generalized dataset, such as the dataset in Fig. 3a.
4. Disassociation algorithm
This section presents our disassociation-based algorithm for anonymizing di-
agnosis codes, which is referred to as DISASSOCIATION. This algorithm performs
three operations: (i) horizontal partitioning, (ii) vertical partitioning, and (iii) re-
fining. Horizontal partitioning brings together similar records with respect to di-
agnosis codes into clusters. As will be explained, performing this operation is
important to preserve privacy with low utility loss. Subsequently, the algorithm
performs vertical partitioning. This operation, which is the heart of our method,
disassociates combinations of diagnosis codes that require protection and creates
chunks. DISASSOCIATION differs from the method of [53] in that it aims at pro-
ducing data that satisfy utility constraints and hence remain useful in medical
analysis. Specifically, the horizontal and vertical partitioning phases in our al-
gorithm treat codes that are contained in utility constraints as first-class citizens,
so that they are preserved in the published dataset to the largest possible extent.
Last, our algorithm performs the refining operation, to further reduce information
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loss and improve the utility of the disassociated data, A high-level pseudocode of
DISASSOCIATION is given in Fig. 6. In addition, Fig. 7 summarizes the notation
used in our algorithm and in the algorithms that perform its operations.
Algorithm: DISASSOCIATION
Input : Original dataset D,
parameters k andm
Output : Disassociated dataset DA
1 Split D into disjoint clusters by applying Algorithm HORPART;
2 for every cluster P produced do
3 Split P vertically into chunks by applying Algorithm VERPART;
4 Refine clusters;
5 return DA;
Figure 6: DISASSOCIATION algorithm.
Symbol Explanation
D,DA Original, anonymized dataset
T The set of all diagnosis codes inD
U Set of utility constraints
TU The set of all diagnosis codes in U
s(a) Support of diagnosis code a
P , P1 . . . Clusters
TP Domain of cluster
C, C1, . . . Record chunks
T1, T2, . . . Domain of record chunk
CT Item chunk
TT Domain of item chunk
Figure 7: Notation used in our DISASSOCIATION algorithm and in the algorithms HORPART and
VERPART.
In the following, we present the details of the horizontal partitioning, vertical
partitioning, and refining operations of our algorithm.
Horizontal partitioning. This operation groups records of the original dataset D
into disjoint clusters, according to the similarity of diagnosis codes. For instance,
cluster P1 is formed by records r1 r5, which have many codes in common, as
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can be seen in Fig. 4. The creation of clusters is performed with a light-weight,
but very effective heuristic, called HORPART. The pseudocode of HORPART is
provided in Fig. 8. This heuristic aims at creating coherent clusters, whose records
will require the least possible disassociation, during vertical partitioning.
To achieve this, the key idea is to split the dataset into two parts, D1 and D2,
according to: (i) the support of diagnosis codes in D (the support of a diagnosis
code a, denoted with s(a), is the number of records inD in which a appears), and
(ii) the participation of diagnosis codes in the utility policy U . At each step, D1
contains all records with the diagnosis code a, whereasD2 contains the remaining
records. This procedure is applied recursively, to each of the constructed parts,
until they are small enough to become clusters. Diagnosis codes that have been
previously used for partitioning are recorded in a set ignore and are not used again.
In each recursive call, Algorithm HORPART selects a diagnosis code a, in lines
3-10. In the first call, a is selected as the most frequent code (i.e., the code with
the largest support), which is contained in a utility constraint. At each subsequent
call, a is selected as the most frequent code, among the codes contained in u (i.e.,
the utility constraint with the code chosen in the previous call) (line 4). When all
diagnosis codes in u have been considered, a is selected as the most frequent code
in the set fT ignoreg, which is also contained in a utility constraint (line 6). Of
course, if no diagnosis code is contained in a utility constraint, we simply select a
as the most frequent diagnosis code (line 9).
Horizontal partitioning reduces the task of anonymizing the original dataset
to the anonymization of small and independent clusters. This way the privacy
guarantee can be achieved more efficiently, since the disassociation process is
restricted in the scope of each created cluster, as described below.
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Algorithm: HORPART
Input : Dataset D,
set of diagnosis codes ignore (initially empty),
a utility constraint u 2 U (initially empty)
Output : A HORizontal PARTitioning of D, i.e., a set of clusters
Param. : The maximum cluster sizemaxClusterSize
1 Let T be the set of diagnosis codes in D, and TU be the set of diagnosis codes
appearing in the utility constraints of U ;
2 if jDj < maxClusterSize then return ffDgg;
3 if fT   ignoregTu 6= fg then
4 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in fT   ignoregTu;
5 else if fT   ignoregTTU 6= fg then
6 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in fT   ignoregTTU ;
7 u the constraint a belongs to;
8 else
9 Find the most frequent diagnosis code a in fT   ignoreg;
10 u fg;
11 D1  the set of all records of D that have a;
12 D2  D  D1;
13 return HORPART(D1; ignore [ a; u)[HORPART(D2; ignore; fg)
Figure 8: HORPART algorithm.
Vertical partitioning. This operation partitions the clusters into chunks, using a
greedy heuristic that is applied to each cluster independently. The intuition behind
the operation of this heuristic, called VERPART, is twofold. First, the algorithm
tries to distribute infrequent combinations of codes into different chunks to pre-
serve privacy, as in [53]. Second, it aims at satisfying the utility constraints, in
which the diagnosis codes in the cluster are contained. To achieve this, the algo-
rithm attempts to create record chunks, which contain as many diagnosis codes
from the same utility constraint as possible. Clearly, creating a record chunk that
contains all the diagnosis codes of one or more utility constraints is beneficial, as
tasks involving these codes (e.g., clinical case count studies) can be performed as
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accurately as in the original dataset.
Algorithm: VERPART
Input : A cluster P , parameters k andm
Output : A km-anonymous VERtical PARTitioning of P
1 Let TP be the set of diagnosis codes of P ;
2 for every diagnosis code t 2 TP do
3 Compute the support s(t);
4 Move all diagnosis codes with s(t) < k from TP into TT ; //TT is finalized
5 Identify the groups of diagnosis codes in TP that belong to the same utility
constraint of U , sort the diagnosis codes of each group in decreasing s(t), and then
sort the groups in decreasing s(t) of their first diagnosis code;
6 i 0;
7 Tremain  TP ;
8 while Tremain 6= fg do
9 Tcur  fg;
10 for every diagnosis code t 2 Tremain do
11 Create a chunk Ctest by projecting to Tcur [ ftg ;
12 if Ctest is km-anonymous then
13 Tcur  Tcur [ ftg;
14 keep track of the constraint in which t is contained (if any);
15 for every diagnosis code t 2 Tcur do
16 if t belongs to a constraint u, which is different from the constraint of the
first diagnosis code added to Tcur and not all diagnosis codes of u are
added to Tcur then
17 Tcur  Tcur   ftg;
18 i i+ 1 ;
19 Ti  Tcur ;
20 Tremain  Tremain   Tcur ;
21 Create record chunks C1; : : : ; Cv by projecting to T1; : : : ; Tv;
22 Create item chunk CT using TT ;
23 return fC1; : : : ; Cv; CT g
Figure 9: VERPART algorithm.
The pseudocode of VERPART is provided in Fig. 9. This algorithm takes as
input a cluster P , along with the parameters k and m, and returns a set of km-
anonymous record chunks C1; : : : ; Cv, and the item chunk CT of P . Given the
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set of diagnosis codes T P in P , VERPART computes the support s(t) of every
code t in P and moves all diagnosis codes having lower support than k from T P
to a set TT (lines 2-4). As the remaining codes have support at least k, they will
participate in some record chunk. Next, it orders T P according to: (i) s(t), and
(ii) the participation of the codes in utility constraints (line 5). Specifically, the
diagnosis codes in P that belong to the same constraint u in U form groups, which
are ordered two times; first in decreasing s(t), and then in decreasing s(t) of their
first (most frequent) diagnosis code.
Subsequently, VERPART computes the sets T1; : : : ; Tv (lines 6-20). To this
end, the set Tremain , which contains the ordered, non-assigned codes, and the set
Tcur , which contains the codes that will be assigned to the current set, are used.
To compute Ti (1  i  v), VERPART considers all diagnosis codes in Tremain
and inserts a code t into Tcur , only if the Ctest chunk, constructed from Tcur [ftg,
remains km-anonymous (line 13). Note that the first execution of the for loop in
line 10, will always add t into Tcur, since Ctest = ftg is km-anonymous. If the
insertion of t to Tcur does not render Tcur [ ftg km-anonymous, t is skipped and
the algorithm considers the next code. While assigning codes from Tremain to Tcur ,
VERPART also tracks the utility constraint that each code is contained in (line 14).
Next, VERPART iterates over each code t in Tcur and removes it from Tcur , if two
conditions are met: (i) t is contained in a utility constraint u that is different from
the constraint of the first code assigned to Tcur , and (ii) all codes in u have also
been assigned to Tcur (lines 16-17). Removing t enables the algorithm to insert
the code into another record chunk (along with the remaining codes of u) in a
subsequent step. After that, VERPART assigns Tcur to Ti, removes the diagnosis
codes of Tcur from Tremain , and continues to the next set Ti+1 (lines 18-20).
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Last, the algorithm constructs and returns the set fC1; : : : ; Cv; CTg (lines 21-
23). This set consists of the record chunks C1; : : : ; Cv, and the item chunk CT ,
which are created in lines 21 and 22, respectively.
Refining. This operation focuses on further improving the utility of the disas-
sociated dataset, while maintaining Guarantee 1. To this end, we examine the
diagnosis codes that reside in the item chunk of each cluster. Consider, for exam-
ple, Fig. 4. The item chunk of the cluster P1 contains the diagnosis codes 834.0
and 944.01, because the support of these codes in P1 is 2 (i.e., lower than k = 3).
For similar reasons, these diagnosis codes are also contained in the item chunk of
P2. However, the support of these codes in both clusters P1 and P2 is not small
enough to violate privacy (i.e., the combination of 834.0 and 944.01 appears as
many times as the one of 296.03 and 294.10 which is in the record chunk of P2).
To handle such situations, we introduce the notion of joint clusters by allowing
different clusters to have common record chunks. Given a set T s of refining codes
(e.g., 834.0 and 944.01 in the aforementioned example), which commonly appear
in the item chunks of two or more clusters (e.g., P1 and P2), we can define a joint
cluster by (i) constructing one or more shared chunks after projecting the original
records of the initial clusters to T s and (ii) removing all diagnosis codes in T s
from the item chunks of the initial clusters. Fig. 10 shows a joint cluster, created
by combining the clusters P1 and P2 of Fig. 4, when T s=f834.0, 944.01g.
Furthermore, large joint clusters can be built by combining smaller joint clus-
ters. Note that the creation of shared chunks is performed similarly to the method
of [53], but shared chunks are created by our VERPART algorithm, which also
takes into account the utility constraints.
We now provide an analysis of the time complexity of our algorithm.
25
Record Item Shared
P1 cluster
f834.0,944.01g
f944.01g
f834.0g
f834.0,944.01g
f834.0,944.01g
f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g
f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g 401.0
f296.00, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g
f296.00, 296.01g f692.71g
f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g f692.71, 695.10g
P2 cluster
f296.03, 295.04g
f294.10, 296.03g 404.00,
f294.10, 295.04, 296.03g 480.1
f294.10, 295.04g
f294.10, 295.04, 296.03g
Figure 10: Disassociation with a shared chunk.
Time Complexity. We first consider each operation of DISASSOCIATION sepa-
rately. The worst-case time complexity of the horizontal partitioning operation is
O(jDj2). This is because HORPART works similarly to the Quicksort algorithm,
but instead of a pivot, it splits each partition by the selecting the code a. Thus, in
the worst case, HORPART performs jDj splits and at each of them it re-orders jDj
records. The time complexity of vertical partitioning depends on the domain T P
of the input cluster P , and not on the characteristics of the complete dataset. The
most expensive operation of VERPART is to ensure that a chunk is km-anonymous,
which requires examining
 jTP j
m

combinations of diagnosis codes. Thus, VER-
PART takes O(jT P j!) time, where T P is small in practice, as we regulate the size
of the clusters. Last, the complexity of the refining operation is O(jDj2). This is
because, in the worst case, the number of passes over the clusters equals the num-
ber of the clusters in D. Thus, the behavior of DISASSOCIATION is dominated
by that of HORPART, as the dataset size grows. Note that this analysis refers to
a worst-case and that, in practice, our algorithm is as efficient as the method in
[53]. This demonstrates that, taking into account utility constraints, has minimal
runtime overhead.
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5. Example of disassociation
This section presents a concrete example of applying DISASSOCIATION to the
dataset D of Fig. 1. The input parameters are k = 3 and m = 2, and that the
maxClusterSize parameter of HORPART is set to 6 3.
Horizontal partitioning. First, DISASSOCIATION performs the horizontal parti-
tioning operation on the original dataset D, using the HORPART algorithm. The
latter algorithm selects 296.00, which participates in constraint u1 of Fig. 3b and
has the largest support. It then splits D into two parts, D1 and D2. D1 consists
of the records containing 296.00 (i.e., r1-r5), whereas D2 contains the remaining
records r6-r10. At this point, 296.00 is moved from the domain T of D1 into the
set ignore, so that it will not be used in subsequent splits of D1. Moreover, the
next call of HORPART for D1 (line 13) is performed with the utility constraint u1
as input. Thus, HORPART tries to further partitionD1, using the codes of this con-
straint. On the contrary, an empty ignore set and no utility constraint are given
as input to HORPART, when it is applied to D2. As the size of both D1 and D2 is
lower than maxClusterSize (condition in line 2 of 8), HORPART produces the
dataset in Fig. 11. This dataset is comprised of the clusters P1 and P2, which
amount to D1 and D2, respectively.
Vertical partitioning. Then, DISASSOCIATION performs vertical partitioning op-
eration, by applying VERPART to each of the clusters P1 and P2. The latter al-
gorithm computes the support of each code in P1, and then moves 401.0, 834.0
and 944.01, from the cluster domain TP into the set TT (line 4 in VERPART).
3This parameter could be set to any value at least equal to the value of k. However, it is fixed
to 2k, because we have observed that this leads to producing good clusters.
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ID Records
r1 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 834.0, 944.01g
r2 f296.00, 296.02, 296.01, 401.0, 944.01, 692.71, 695.10g
r3 f296.00, 296.02, 692.71, 834.0, 695.10g
r4 f296.00, 296.01, 692.71, 401.0g
r5 f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g
ID Records
r6 f296.03, 295.04, 404.00, 480.1g
r7 f294.10, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01g
r8 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 480.1g
r9 f294.10, 295.04, 404.00g
r10 f294.10, 295.04, 296.03, 834.0, 944.01g
Figure 11: Output of horizontal partitioning on D.
The codes are moved to TT , which corresponds to the domain of the item chunk,
because they have a lower support than k = 3. Thus, TP now contains f296.00,
296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g, and it is sorted according to the support of these
codes in P1 and their participation in a utility constraint of U . Specifically, for the
utility constraints of Fig. 3b, we distinguish two groups of codes in TP ; a group
f296.00, 296.01, 296.02g, which contains the codes in u1, and another group
f692.71, 695.10g with the codes in u2. Next, VERPART sorts the first group in
descending order of the support of its codes. Thus, 296.00 is placed first and fol-
lowed by 296.01 and 296.02. The second group is sorted similarly. After that, the
two groups are sorted in descending order of the support of their first code. Thus,
the final ordering of TP is f296.00, 296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g.
Subsequently, VERPART constructs the record chunks of P1 (lines 10-14), as
follows. First, it selects 296.00 and checks whether the set of projections of the
records r1-r5 on this code is 32-anonymous. This holds, as 296.00 appears in all
records of P1. Thus, VERPART places 296.00 into the set Tcur, which will later
be used to define the record chunk C1. Then, the algorithm selects 296.01 and
checks whether the projections of all records r1-r5 on f296.00, 296.01g are also
32-anonymous. As this is true, 296.01 is moved to Tcur, and the same procedure
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is performed, for each of the codes 296.02, 692.71, and 695.10. When the projec-
tions of the records r1-r5 are found to be 32-anonymous, the corresponding code is
added to Tcur. Otherwise, it is left in a set Tremain to be used in a subsequent step.
Notice that 296.02 and 692.71 are added into Tcur, but the code 695.10 is not.
This is because the combination of codes 296.01 and 695.10 appears in only two
records of P1 (i.e., r2 and r5), hence, the projections of records r1-r5 on f296.00,
296.01, 296.02, 692.71, 695.10g are not 32-anonymous.
After considering all codes in TP , VERPART checks whether the codes of a
constraint u 2 U are only partially added to Tcur. This is true for 692.71, which
is separated from 695.10 of the same constraint u2. Hence, 692.71 is moved from
Tcur back to Tremain (line 17), so that it can be added to the chunk C2 of P1 along
with 695.10. After that, the algorithm finalizes the chunk C1, according to Tcur,
empties the latter set, and proceeds to creating C2. By following this procedure
for the cluster P2, VERPART constructs the dataset DA in Fig. 4.
Refining. During this operation, DISASSOCIATION constructs the shared chunks,
which are shown in Figure 10, as follows. It inspects the item chunks of P1 and
P2 in Fig. 4, and it identifies that each of the codes 834.0 and 944.01 appears in
two records of P1, as well as in two records of P2. Note that the actual supports of
codes in item chunks are available to the algorithm after the vertical partitioning
operation, although they are not evident from Fig. 4 (because they are completely
hidden in the published dataset). Since the total support of 834.0 and 944.01 in
both clusters is 2 + 2 = 4 > k = 3, the algorithm reconstructs the projections
of r1-r5 and r6-r10 on the item chunk domain of P1 and P2 respectively, and calls
VERPART, which creates the shared chunk of Fig. 10.
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6. Experimental evaluation
6.1. Experimental data and setup
We implemented all algorithms in C++ and applied them to the INFORMS
dataset [8], whose characteristics are shown in Table 1. This dataset was used in
INFORMS 2008 Data Mining contest, whose objective was to develop predictive
methods for identifying high-risk patients, admitted for elective surgery. In our
experiments, we retained the diagnosis code part of patient records only.
We evaluated the effectiveness of our DISASSOCIATION algorithm, referred to
as Dis, by comparing to CBA, the state-of-the-art generalization-based algorithm
for preventing identity disclosure based on diagnosis codes. The default parame-
ters were k=5 andm=2, and the hierarchies used in CBA were created as in [34].
All experiments ran on an Intel Xeon at 2.4 GHz with 12 GB of RAM.
Dataset jDj Distinct codes Max, Avg # codes/record
INFORMS 58302 631 43, 5.11
Table 1: Description of the dataset.
To evaluate data utility, we employed the ARE and MRE measures, discussed
in Section 3.3. For the computation of ARE, we used two different types of query
workloads. The first workload type, referred to as W1, contains queries asking
for sets of diagnosis codes that a certain percentage of all patients have. In other
words, these queries retrieve frequent itemsets (i.e., sets of diagnosis codes that
appear in at least a specified percentage of transactions, expressed using a mini-
mum support threshold). Answering such queries accurately is crucial in various
biomedical data analysis applications [34], since frequent itemsets serve as build-
ing blocks in several data mining models [31]. The second workload type we
considered is referred to asW2 and contains 1000 queries, which retrieve sets of
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diagnosis codes, selected uniformly at random. These queries are important, be-
cause it may be difficult for data owners to predict many of the analytic tasks that
will be applied to anonymized data by data recipients.
In addition, we evaluatedMRE using three classes of utility policies: hierarchy-
based, similarity-based, and frequency-based. The first two types of policies
have been introduced in [34] and model semantic relationships between diagno-
sis codes. For hierarchy-based policies, these relationships are formed using the
ICD hierarchy. Specifically, hierarchy-based utility policies are constructed by
forming a different utility constraint for all 5-digit ICD codes that have a com-
mon ancestor (other than the root) in the ICD hierarchy. The common ancestor
of these codes is a 3-digit ICD code, Section, or Chapter4, for the case of level
1, level 2, and level 3 hierarchy-based policies, respectively. The similarity-based
utility policies are comprised from utility constraints that contain the same num-
ber of sibling 5-digit ICD codes in the hierarchy. Specifically, we considered
similarity-based constraints containing 5, 10, 25, and 100 codes and refer to their
associated utility policies as sim 5, 10, 25, and 100, respectively. Last, we con-
sidered frequency-based utility policies that model frequent itemsets. We mined
frequent itemsets using the FP-Growth algorithm [27], which was configured with
a varying minimum support threshold in f0:625; 1:25; 2:5; 5g. Thus, the generated
utility constraints contain sets of diagnosis codes that appear in at least 0:625%,
1:25%, 2:5%, and 5% percent of transactions, respectively. The utility policies
associated with such constraints are denoted with sup 0.625, 1.25, 2.5, and 5, re-
spectively. Unless otherwise stated, we use level 1, sim 10, and sup 0.625, as the
4Sections and Chapters are internal nodes in the ICD hierarchy, which model aggregate con-
cepts http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/icd9/icdguide10.pdf.
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default hierarchy, similarity, and frequency based utility policy, respectively.
6.2. Feasibility of identity disclosure
The risk of performing identity disclosure was quantified by measuring the
number of records that share a set (combination) of m diagnosis codes. This
number is equal to the inverse of the probability of performing identity disclosure
using any subset of these codes. The result in Fig. 12 shows that more than 17% of
all sets of 2 diagnosis codes appear in one record. Consequently, more than 17% of
patients are uniquely re-identifiable, based on these sets of codes, if the dataset is
released intact. Furthermore, fewer than 5% of records contain a diagnosis code
that appears at least 5 times. Thus, approximately 95% of records are unsafe,
as the corresponding patients are identifiable with probability that exceeds 0:2,
the threshold typically used in privacy-preserving medical data publishing [19].
Moreover, observe that the number of times a set of diagnosis codes appears in the
dataset increases with m. For example, 96% of sets containing 5 diagnosis codes
appear only once. As we will see shortly, our algorithm can guard against attackers
with such knowledge, by enforcing km-anonymity with m = 5, and at the same
time preserve data utility. This is in contrast toCBA and most generalization-based
methods (e.g., [54]).
6.3. Comparison with CBA
In this set of experiments, we demonstrate that our method can enforce km-
anonymity, while allowing more accurate query answering than CBA.
We first report ARE for query workloads of type W2 and for the following
utility policies: level 1 (hierarchy-based), sim 10 (similarity-based), and sup 1.25
(frequency-based). For a fair comparison, the diagnosis codes retrieved by all
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Figure 12: Number of records in which a percentage of combinations, containing 2 to 5 diagnosis
codes, appears.
queries are among those that are not suppressed by CBA. Fig. 13a illustrates
the results for the level 1 policy. The ARE for Dis is 6 times smaller on av-
erage, and up to 16 times smaller, than that of CBA. This shows that the use
of disassociation instead of generalization allows enforcing km-anonymity with
low information loss. Figs. 13b and 13c show the corresponding results for the
similarity-based and frequency-based policies, respectively. Again, our method
outperformed CBA, achieving ARE scores that are 4.5 and 7.4 times better, on
average. Quantitatively similar results were obtained for query workloads of type
W1 (omitted, for brevity).
Next, we report the number of distinct diagnosis codes that are suppressed
when k is set to 5,m varies in [2; 3], and the utility policies of the previous exper-
iment are used. The results in Fig. 14 show that CBA suppressed a relatively large
number of diagnosis codes, particularly when strong privacy is required and the
utility constraints are stringent. For instance, 23:6% (i.e., 149 out of 631) of dis-
tinct diagnoses codes were suppressed, when m = 3 and the level 1 utility policy
was used. On the contrary, our method released all diagnoses codes intact, as it
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(a) level 1 (b) sim 10 (c) sup 1.25
Figure 13: Comparison with CBA with respect to ARE for query workloads of type W2 and for
different utility policies.
Figure 14: Percentage of distinct diagnosis codes that are suppressed by CBA (no diagnosis codes
are suppressed by our method, by design).
does not employ suppression. This is particularly useful for medical studies (e.g.,
in epidemiology), where a large number of codes are of interest.
Having established that our method outperforms CBA in terms of achieving
km-anonymity with low information loss, we do not include results for CBA in the
remainder of the section.
6.4. Supporting clinical case count studies
In the following, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method at producing
data that support clinical case count studies.
Fig. 15a illustrates the results for all three hierarchy-based policies and for
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query workloads of type W1. These workloads require retrieving a randomly
selected set of 1 to 4 diagnosis codes. For consistency, a set of c diagnosis codes
is built (extended) by adding a random code to its subset containing c 1 codes.
Observe that the error in query answering is fairly small and increases with the
size of sets of diagnosis codes. This is because larger sets appear in few records
and are more difficult to preserve in km-anonymous data [53]. Furthermore, it
can be seen that low ARE scores are achieved, even for the level 1 utility policy,
which is difficult to satisfy using generalization (e.g., CBA suppressed 14:3% of
distinct diagnosis codes to satisfy this policy when m = 2, as shown in Fig. 14).
Similar observations can be made from Figs. 15b and 15c, which show the results
for similarity-based and frequency-based constraints, respectively.
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Figure 15: ARE for query workloads of type W1 that retrieve 1 to 4 diagnosis codes and for
different utility policies.
Fig. 16a shows the results with respect to ARE, for hierarchy-based con-
straints and query workloads of typeW2. The corresponding results for similarity-
based and frequency-based constraints are reported in Figs. 16b and 16c, respec-
tively. Note that ARE scores are very low, in all tested cases. In addition, queries
involving more frequent sets of diagnosis codes (i.e., sets mined with a higher
minimum support threshold) can be answered highly accurately, which helps pre-
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serve data utility in various data mining tasks.
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Figure 16: ARE for query workloads of typeW2 and for different utility policies.
Next, we examined the impact of k on ARE by varying this parameter in
[5; 25], setting m to 2, and considering the level 1, sim 10, and sup 2.5 utility
policies. The results, reported in Fig. 17, show that ARE increases with k. This is
because it is more difficult to retain associations between diagnosis codes, when
clusters are large. However, the ARE scores are low (i.e., no more than 0:05),
which confirms that our method permits accurate query answering, even for large
k values that offer more privacy.
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Figure 17: ARE for varying k in [5; 25] and for different utility policies.
6.5. Effectiveness in medical analytic tasks
In this set of experiments, we evaluate our method in terms of its effectiveness
at supporting different utility policies. Given a utility policy, we measure MRE,
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for all constraints in the policy, and report the percentage of constraints, whose
MRE falls into a certain interval. Recall from Section 6.1 that intervals whose
endpoints are close to zero are preferred.
Fig. 18 reports the results with respect to MRE for the level 1 utility policy. As
can be seen, the MRE of all constraints in this policy is in [ 24%; 5%), while the
MRE of the vast majority of constraints falls into much narrower intervals. For
instance, 81% and 90% of these constraints have an MRE in [ 2:5%; 2:5%) and in
[ 5%; 5%), respectively. Furthermore, the percentage of constraints with anMRE
score close to zero is generally higher compared to those with MRE is far from
zero. For example, 37:6% of the constraints have MRE in [ 2:5%; 0%], whereas
only 3:7% of them have an MRE in [ 24%; 10%). This confirms that the data
produced by our method can support the intended analytic tasks, in addition to
permitting accurate query answering.
0
20
40
60
(%
)o
fu
til
ity
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
[-24,-10) [-10,-5) [-5,2.5) [-2.5,0) 0 (0,2.5) [2.5,5)
intervals of MRE
level 1
Figure 18: MRE for level 1 utility policy.
Next, we performed a similar experiment for similarity-based and frequency-
based utility policies. The results for the sim 5 policy are shown in Fig. 19.
Note that 81% and 90% of the utility constraints in this policy have an MRE in
[ 2:5%; 2:5%] and in [ 5%; 5%), respectively and only 3:6% of them have an
MRE in [ 21%; 10%). The results for the sup 0.625 utility policy are quantita-
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tively similar, as can be seen in Fig. 20. That is, all constraints in this policy have
an MRE in a narrow range [ 10%; 5%). These results together with those in Figs.
18 and 19 suggest that the data produced by our method can support different
types of utility policies fairly well.
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Figure 19: MRE for the sim 5 utility policy.
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Figure 20: MRE for the sup 0.625 utility policy.
In addition, we examined the impact of k on MRE, for different classes of
utility policies. Figs. 21, 22, and 23 illustrate the results for hierarchy-based,
similarity-based, and frequency-based policies, respectively. It can be seen that,
lowering k, helps the production of data that support the specified utility policies.
For instance, 95:3% of hierarchy-based constraints have an MRE in [ 5%; 5%)
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when k = 2, but 53% of such constraints have an MRE in this interval when
k = 25. The corresponding percentages are 100% and 33% for similarity-based
utility constraints, and 95% and 59% for frequency-based utility constraints. This
is expected due to the utility/privacy trade-off. However, the MRE of most of the
constraints (i.e., 75:7, 72:3, and 85:9% on average, for the tested k values, in the
case of hierarchy-based, similarity-based, and frequency-based constraints) falls
into [ 5%; 5%). Thus, our method is effective at supporting the intended medical
analytic tasks.
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Figure 21: MRE for hierarchy-based utility policies and for varying k in [2; 25].
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Figure 22: MRE for similarity-based utility policies and for varying k in [2; 25].
Last, we investigated the effectiveness of our method with respect to MRE,
whenm is set to 5. It is interesting to examine data utility in this setting, because
39
020
40
60
80
100
(%
)o
fu
til
ity
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
[-10,-5) [-5,2.5) [-2.5,0) 0 (0,2.5) [5,10)
intervals of MRE
k=2 k=5 k=10 k=15 k=25
Figure 23: MRE for frequency-based utility policies and for varying k in [2; 25].
a patient’s record in discharge summaries, which may be used in identity disclo-
sure attacks, often contains 5 diagnosis codes, which are assigned during a single
hospital visit. Thus, enforcing km-anonymity, using m = 5, provides protection
from such attacks, assuming a worst case scenario in which data owners do not
know which diagnoses codes may be used by attackers. In our experiments, we
considered different classes of utility policies (namely, level 1, sim 10, and sup
2.5) and report the results in Fig. 24. Notice that the data produced by our method
remain useful for supporting the utility policies, as 89%, 93%, and 100% of the
tested hierarchy-based, similarity-based, and frequency-based constraints have an
MRE in [ 5%; 5%), respectively.
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7. Discussion
This section explains how our approach can be extended to deal with different
types of medical data and privacy requirements.
7.1. Dealing with data of different types
Our work considers records comprised of a set of diagnosis codes, following
[33, 35, 34]. However, some applications require different types of data. For
example, applications that aim at identifying phenotypes in the context of ge-
netic association studies, require data in which a record contains repeated diag-
nosis codes (i.e., a multiset of diagnosis codes). Dealing with these applications
is straightforward, as it requires a pre-processing in which different instances of
the same diagnosis code in the dataset, and the utility constraints, are mapped to
different values (e.g., the first occurrence of 250.01 is mapped to 250.011, the
second to 250.012 etc.) [34]. Other applications require releasing data that con-
tains both diagnosis codes and demographics. Anonymizing this type of data has
been considered very recently [48], although the proposed methodology employs
generalization and is not directly applicable to releasing patient information. Ex-
tending our approach, so that it can be used as a component of this methodology
is an interesting direction for future work.
7.2. Dealing with different privacy requirements
Our work focuses on preventing identity disclosure which is the most impor-
tant privacy requirement in the healthcare domain. It ensures that an attacker with
background knowledge of up to m codes in a record cannot associate this record
with fewer than k candidate patients. However, the anonymization framework we
propose is not restricted to guarding against attackers with only partial knowledge
41
of the codes in a record in D. In fact, by setting m to the maximum number of
codes in a record of D, data owners can prevent attacks based on knowledge of
all codes in a record. This is because the dataset that is produced by our method
in this case satisfies Guarantee 1. Regardless of the specific values of k and m,
we do not consider collaborative attacks, where two or more attackers combine
their knowledge in order to re-identify a patient nor attackers with background
knowledge of multiple records in D. Such powerful attack schemes can only be
handled within stronger privacy principles, such as differential privacy (see Sec-
tion 2). However, applying these principles usually results in significantly lower
utility, compared to the output of our method, which offers a reasonable tradeoff.
Furthermore, we do not assume any distinction between sensitive and non-
sensitive diagnosis codes (see Section 3). Instead, we treat all codes as poten-
tially identifying. However, when there is clear distinction between sensitive and
non-sensitive codes in a record, i.e., data owners know that some codes (the sen-
sitive ones) are not known to any attacker, then our framework allows thwarting
attribute disclosure as well. An effective principle for preventing attribute dis-
closure is `-diversity [40]. Enforcing `-diversity using our framework is rather
straightforward, as it simply requires (i) ignoring all sensitive codes during the
horizontal partitioning operation, and (ii) placing all sensitive codes in the item
chunk during vertical partitioning. This produces a dataset DA, in which all sen-
sitive codes are contained in the item chunks. This dataset limits the probability
of any association between sensitive codes and any other subrecord or code to 1jP j ,
where jP j is the size of the cluster. Clearly, the desired degree of `-diversity can
be achieved in this case, by adjusting the size of the clusters.
In general, protection from attribute disclosure within our framework tends
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to incur higher information loss than simply protecting from identity disclosure.
This is because sensitive codes are not necessarily infrequent, i.e., they may ap-
pear more than k times in a cluster. Thus, the frequent sensitive codes that would
be placed in a km-anonymous record chunk, when only identity disclosure is pre-
vented, are now placed in the item chunk and each of them is completely disas-
sociated from any other. In this case, the utility constraints that include sensitive
codes are not preserved in the published dataset to the extent they would be pre-
served when only guarding against identity disclosure is required. Of course, this
does not hold for the remaining utility constraints. The evaluation of our method
with protection from both identity and attribute disclosure is left as future work.
8. Conclusions
Ensuring that diagnosis codes cannot be used in identity disclosure attacks is
necessary but challenging, particularly when data need to be shared broadly and to
support a range of medical analytic tasks that may not be determined prior to data
dissemination. To this end, we proposed a novel, disassociation-based approach
that enforces km-anonymity with low information loss. Our approach does not
require data owners to specify diagnosis codes, as existing methods do, and takes
into account analytic tasks that published data are intended for. Extensive exper-
iments using EHR data confirm that our approach can produce data that permit
various types of clinical case count studies and general medical analysis tasks to
be performed accurately.
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